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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - INDIGENT'S RIGHT TO ASSIGNED COUNSEL
IN NON-CAPITAL STATE CASES
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962)
The "fair trial" rule of Betts v. Brady' has survived twenty years of
direct and indirect attack. Under this rule, the controlling law in non-
capital state cases, the right to court appointed counsel depends upon
an "appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case."2 The rule requires
appointment of counsel only when "special circumstances" exist which
render a fair trial impossible.3 But, by virtue of Carnley v. Cochran,4 the
factors constituting "special circumstances" have been so extended as
to cast doubt upon the future longevity of the rule.
Carnley instituted habeas corpus proceedings in the Florida Supreme
Court, attacking the validity of his conviction5 on the ground that his
trial without assistance of counsel was an unconstitutional denial of due
process of law. Without hearing the merits of Carnley's claim, the
Florida Supreme Court discharged the writ.! The United States Supreme
Court reversed and remanded,' finding sufficient "special circumstances"
to require the assistance of counsel
In regard to the issue of "special circumstances," the Court determined
that the assistance of counsel might have benefited Carnley in several
respects. First, because of the complexity of the statutory provisions
applicable to Carnley's offense,9 an attorney might have successfully
1. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
2. Id. at 462.
3. Id. at 473.
4. 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
5. Petitioner was convicted on two counts, the first charging "incest" and the second charg-
ing "fondling." He was sentenced to a term of six months to twenty years under the Child
Molester Act. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 801.03(1) (1959).
6. Carnley v. Cochran, 123 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1960).
7. Although requested by Carnley to reverse the decision of the Florida Supreme Court
(Brief for Petitioner, p. 21), the Court reversed and remanded the case for a hearing on the
question of waiver of the right to counsel.
8. Mr. Justice Black, while concurring in the result, expressed the view that the guarantees
of the sixth amendment should be applicable to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. He was also of the opinion that Betts v. Brady should be overruled.
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 519 (1962) (concurring opinion). Mr. Justice Douglas,
joined by Chief Justice Warren, also concurred in the result but thought that Betts v. Brady
should be overruled. Id. at 520.
9. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 507-08 (1962). FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 741.22, 800.04
(1959) deal generally with the crimes of incest and assault in a lewd, lascivious, and indecent
manner. FLA. STAT. At-N. § 801.02 (1959) is applicable to both offenses if committed on a
person fourteen years of age or younger.
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attacked the validity of the conviction as being repugnant to the Florida
Constitution.'" Second, even if the conviction were valid, special pro-
visions of the Child Molester Act might have been invoked for Carnley's
benefit." Third, the Court found that Carnley's illiteracy coupled with
the trial judge's inadequate advice to him regarding his rights bolstered
his allegation of the unfairness of a trial without the aid of counsel.'
In so far as "special circumstances" were found to exist because of the
complexity of the legal issues involved and because of Carnley's illiteracy,
this decision is in accord with prior Supreme Court determinations."8
However, in regard to the inadequate advice of the trial judge, the Court
found "special circumstances" to exist where it had not found them be-
fore.'" It pointed out that, although the trial judge had advised Carnley
of his right not to testify, he had not informed him of the consequences
of testifying. Moreover, Carnley had not been advised of his right to
examine prospective jurors on voir dire, of his right to submit instruc-
tions for the jury, nor of his right to object to the instructions that had
been given.'" The Court also pointed out that no objections had been
entered by Carnley, nor was there sufficient evidence of a competent
cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses1 e
Although the Court did not state that the trial judge's inadequate
advice and protection of Carnley's rights were sufficient, in themselves,
10. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 508 n.2, citing Copeland v. State, 76 So. 2d 137
(Fla. 1954). "In the Copeland case... the Florida Supreme Court held that the inclusion
of rape in the Child Molester Act - with its attendant alteration in the consequences of that
offense when committed against a child of 14 or younger - ran afoul of the State Constitution
because the Act embraced 11 distinct crimes separately dealt with in other statutes, because the
Act failed to set forth at length the general rape provisions which were pro tanto amended,
and because the title of the Act failed to give notice that the consequences of rape had been
changed." Ibid.
11. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 509-10 (1962). FLA STAT. ANN. § 801.03(1)
(1959) provides for the alternative punishments of imprisonment or commitment to a state
hospital. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 801.08 (1959) allows for the suspension of the sentence or
probation. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 801.10 (1959) enables the accused to petition the court for
a psychiatric examination.
12. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1962).
13. Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1961) (recidivist statute); McNeal v. Culver,
365 U.S. 109 (1961) (question of whether the crime charged actually existed); Rice v. Olson,
324 U.S. 786 (1945) (lack of jurisdiction over the offense).
Illiteracy or semi-literacy has been a factor in many cases. See, e.g.,McNeal v. Culver, 365
U.S. 109 (1961); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S.
672 (1948).
14. In other cases errors of the trial judge have been held to constitute "special circumstances,"
but the errors, in those cases were of a more serious nature than those in Carnley. See Hudson
v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960) (failure of court to give cautionary instructions
when co-defendant confessed in open court before the jury); Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633
(1959) (admission of questionable testimony); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949) (ad-
mission of inadmissable hearsay and incompetent evidence).
15. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 511 (1962).
16. Ibid.
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to render the trial unfair, it stated that they were significant."7 Since no
one factor is controlling"8 and one factor may be sufficient, 9 it is reason-
able to assume that, had there been only these "special circumstances"
present, the same result would have been reached. Therefore, the Court
has, in effect, extended "special circumstances" to include errors nor-
mally occurring in any trial and, in so doing, has eliminated the standard
of Betts v. Brady without expressly overruling that case.
Although the problems created by the "fair trial" rule are numerous,
the most significant is the vagueness of the standard. The factors con-
stituting "special circumstances" have varied from case to case, 0 and it
is virtually impossible to ascertain at the outset of the trial if such factors
are present." Thus, the trial court has been left without a meaningful
criterion for determining whether counsel is necessary to prevent a denial
of due process of law. Since in Carnley v. Cochran "special circum-
stances" were found to exist in the commonly occurring errors of a
normal trial, it would seem that the only safe course for a state trial
court to follow to prevent a subsequent vitiation of its decision would
be to appoint counsel in all non-capital cases.
For all practical purposes the "fair trial" rule of Betts v. Brady has
been abrogated, and, for the state's process to constitute due process of
law, the court must appoint counsel in non-capital cases as it is presently
required to do in capital cases. 2 The only step remaining is the in-
evitable, formal overruling of Betts v. Brady."3
DON HAYWOOD PACE
17. Ibid.
18. Quicksall v. State, 339 U.S. 660, 666 (1950); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 780
(1949); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 675 (1948).
19. See Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960) (trial court's failure to give ap-
propriate instructions); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948) (youth); White v.
Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945) (accused tried without opportunity for preparation).
20. E.g., compare DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947), with Gayes v. New York,
332 U.S. 145 (1947).
21. See Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); Buchanan v. O'Brien, 181 F.2d 601 (1st
Cir. 1950).
22. See Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945).
23. The formal overruling of Betts v. Brady is very likely to occur in either this term of the
Supreme Court or the next. This seems evident in view of the fact that the Court in granting
certiorai has instructed the petitioner to prepare argument on whether it should reconsider the
decision of Betts v. Brady. Gideon v. Cochran, cert. granted, 37. U.S. 908 (1962).
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